In the current energy climate, there are few certainties. In days past, it was a good bet that falling upstream capex one year would be followed by a rebound the next. Importantly, declines in upstream capex occurred only twice in the more than 25 years from 1988 to 2014. The two instances were a decade apart, and in both cases, a rebound ensued the following year.

So what’s the take on a 41% decline in drillbit capex in one year, succeeded by an estimated 52% decrease the next, for a cumulative drop in upstream capex of 71% from 2014 to 2016?

These are estimates by Simmons & Co. International, and they are not wide of the mark if Anadarko Petroleum Corp. is typical. For 2016, its initial budget is projected to be $2.8 billion, nearly 50% lower than its actual capex in 2015 and almost 70% lower than its 2014 capex. And this is from an E&P that estimated it can hold production roughly flat using just 66% of last year’s maintenance capex.

In an earlier era, this scale of capex retrenchment would have given rise to talk of industry conditions being “darkest before the dawn.” Today, people are prone to add a quip about whether the advancing light truly reflects brighter times ahead or a locomotive about to run you over.

Industry players are looking for answers as to how best to cope with the hard realities of recent West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude prices hovering around $30/bbl. Does it really make sense to drill at these prices?

Veering from the norm, Raymond James suggested E&Ps take a hard look at the economics of buying back steeply discounted unsecured debt versus continuing to drill at distressed commodity prices.

E&Ps have in many cases seen their noninvestment grade bonds trade down to “massive discounts to par,” noted Raymond James analysts, allowing issuers to buy back debt at yields to maturities of 30% or higher. This “safer return on capital” compares to sub-20%, or even negative, returns earned by “the vast majority of the E&P industry,” given commodity prices around $35/bbl and $2.30/Mcf.

Raymond James estimated that almost 20% of unsecured debt in its E&P coverage offered a yield to maturity of 30% or greater, amounting to roughly $26 billion in debt that is attractive to repurchase.

The level at which E&P issuers’ debt trades is a function of several factors, including the absolute level and direction of the underlying commodity. For crude, this is influenced by the balance of global supply and demand trends, in turn shaped by the near-term actions of key oil producers, not the least of which is OPEC lynchpin producer Saudi Arabia.

So how long can Saudi Arabia continue pumping at around $30/bbl? While the country has one of the lowest oil finding and development costs, analysts at Sanford Bernstein calculated it needs an oil price of about $96/bbl to break even on its 2016 government budget.

At about $37/bbl, Saudi Arabia is on track to post a record budget deficit equivalent to $149 billion in 2016, said the Bernstein report, while the net surplus accumulated from prior budgets during periods of high oil prices will turn to a net debt position in 2018, based on strip pricing prevailing in January.

If oil stays at $30/bbl, the net debt position would accelerate into 2017.

If funding were drawn from Saudi foreign exchange reserves, at $628 billion, “even these will become depleted by 2020, making a devaluation highly likely, if the forward curve is correct,” the Bernstein analysts said. As of the report’s January writing, the curve showed oil rising from $36.60/bbl in 2016 to $53/bbl in 2020.

“The lower oil prices go, the faster the capitulation in non-OPEC supply,” is, in a nutshell, the Saudi strategy, said Bernstein. Pending rebalancing of global markets—or another resolution—Saudi Arabia will be forced to slash its budget or sell assets (possibly Saudi Aramco downstream assets), with devaluation viewed as “an option of last resort.”

These are unpredictable times. Budgetary issues are of consequence even to Saudi Arabia. Issues of having to slash budgets and sell assets may sound eerily familiar to U.S. producers, albeit recognizing the strong cushion of reserves and levers to pull still held by the Saudis.

As for rumors abounding as to possible OPEC meetings to clear the overhang of crude, who can see through the haze of volatile characters, geopolitical complications and unintended consequences?

It’s an age of uncertainty.