There is an old quip that goes, “If it doesn’t kill you, it’ll make you stronger,” that seems to apply to recent market conditions that one exploration and production (E&P) company CEO called “brutal.” Assuming we do live to tell the tale, we’ll remember a spate of factors that have recently added up to a wild, wild world in oil.

Against a backdrop of warnings of crude oil going to $75 per barrel (bbl) and lower, there has been no shortage of supposed facts and figures flying across news outlets. Even OPEC Secretary-General Abdalla El-Badri cautioned against everyone “panicking,” before going on to contend that about half of unconventional plays would be under pressure at slightly over $80/bbl for West Texas Intermediate (WTI).

The $80/bbl mark seems to be a pivotal point. The Paris-based International Energy Agency (IEA) has reportedly found that only about 4% of U.S. shale oil production needs prices above $80/bbl to break even. On a much larger scale, it also found that roughly 2.6 million bbl/d of world crude oil production—in such disparate places as Canada, China, Malaysia, Nigeria, the U.K. and Russia—also come from projects with a breakeven price in excess of $80/bbl.

But it’s not as if there’s an orderly re-calibration of oil production by economic limits each quarter, neatly matching up supply and demand. Does anyone think Russia, Nigeria—or perhaps least of all, a very financially precarious Venezuela—are going to pare back production upon the arrival of a more efficient supply source?

With a shrinking U.S. market for overseas producers, the real disruption mighht have stemmed from the forced realignment of producer-customer relations. Nigeria, for example, sold not a single barrel to the U.S. in July—for the first time since records began in 1973. Those barrels were likely targeted to Asian markets, principally China, in competition with other West African and Middle Eastern producers.

By now, we should know if Saudi Arabia, contrary to expectations, led an OPEC cut in production; after all, that’s their “job,” as some observers put it. But, having brought on more refining capacity, Saudi Arabia is less sensitive to crude prices. And, with a reported $735 billion in reserves, it is better positioned to ride out low oil prices, even if it nominally needs Brent oil prices of $90/bbl for a balanced budget.

That’s a lot better than, say, Iran or Libya, which depend on Brent in the $130 to $140/bbl range.

In the U.S., the downdraft in crude pricing from the global scramble to defend market share has been painful for E&Ps, which, based on second-quarter data, were collectively only at slightly over 30% hedged on their 2015 production. And favorable pricing levels for new hedging became less attainable as the backwardation of the crude futures curve flattened out.

Much in terms of investor psychology will depend on how long the steep price drop in crude continues.

If of greater duration, it will be harder to revive the growth model of E&Ps regularly outspending cash flow but doing so with the confidence they can finance the shortfalls through an accommodating debt or equity market.

This is what has allowed E&Ps to attain their recent rapid growth trajectories. And it helped attract growth-oriented investors to a sector that became “investible” rather than one made up of “trading stocks,” provided crude prices moved in a fairly stable trading range.

The downside of an extended trough in crude prices is one of greater risk to valuations, and this was highlighted in October by analyst Rehan Rashid of FBR Capital Markets. “We are of the opinion that the last few weeks have cemented the cyclicality of the business in investors’ minds, and that this will result in secular multiple compression for the industry.”

While it might be too early to draw such a clear-cut conclusion, the onus on the industry going forward represents a rare balancing act between setting suitable growth targets and simultaneously preserving E&P balance-sheet strength. But beyond that, perhaps the ultimate irony—amid the current tension between the U.S. growing production while OPEC countries fight to maintain market share—is that the U.S. has effectively been the only significant non-OPEC source of supply of late. While the growth in U.S. output might add to excess supplies in the short term, that same supply might well be needed to meet global demand growth in the years ahead.

So, if alive, hang in there—you might even get stronger.